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This research project aims to investigate the size anomaly in the Shenzhen A 
Shares Market. Seven portfolios, each contains eleven securities are being tested. 
Raw returns and excess returns to the Shenzhen A Index from 1994 to 1995 are used 
to see whether there is a size effect. It is noticed that when using the raw returns, the 
Shenzhen A Shares Market shows size effect as in other markets. Yet, the result is not 
significant. On the other hand, when excess returns are used, the medium size 
portfolio is found to have the highest rate of return and the result is significant. 
Concerning the seasonal effect, a "September effect" is observed and the result is 
significant. 
The "September effect" is muchly caused by the rumour of releasing the 
regulation of foreign investors participating in A shares market and the hot money 
from Taiwan and Hong Kong in the second half of 1994. Since only two-year data are 
used, the special events in 1994 highly bias the result. 
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Size effect, also known as small firm effect, first introduced by Banz (1981)， 
has generated lots of controversial discussions. Many enqjirical researches have 
identified this regularity in asset prices as anomalies. They report that there exists a 
negative relation between abnormal returns and the market capitalizations of some 
prevailing theories like capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT), or that the capital markets are inefficient 
On the other hand, some studies argue that this size-related regulaties in assets 
prices should not be regarded as anomalies because they show that there is no positive 
correlation between the size of a firm and its risk. The expected return predicted by an 
asset pricing model sometimes differing from the actual expected return may be caused 
by a mean-variance inefficient proxy portfolio of an error in estimating the beta of the 
portfolio. This does not imqplies that the CAPM is misspecified. 
Many attentions have been paid to the Western stock markets and even some 
developing markets like Singapore and Mexico. However, very few papers have 
studied the situation in China stock market, which is under the socialist economy. 
China stock market is a very unique market when comqpared with other markets. The 
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mechanism is highly controlled by the government. Many listed companies are state-
owaed enterprises. Political and economic reforms have great influence on the 
performance. Macroeconomic factors are far more crucial to investors than any 
insights gleaned from murky Chinese corporate accounts. The threat of hyperinflation 
have much intact on the shares prices. The austerity measures by the government 
affect on the money supply in the market and the accessibility of credits for the 
coir^anies as well. A sudden slamming on of the monetary brakes by the authorities 
would dry up liquidity and send shares reeling. Guess and rumour regarding the health 
of Deng Xiao Ping would make the stock market highly fluctuated. The third 
generation leaders also make use of the monetary market as a tool to strengthen their 
power. 
Li this paper, the China stock market would be investigated to see whether the 
size effect exists in this emerging market. Specifically, the Shenzhen A shares market, 




Banz (1981) first documents the empirical relationship between the return and 
the total market value of NYSE common stocks. He finds that smaller firms had 
higher risk adjusted returns, on average, than larger firms during 1936-1975 and refers 
the result as the "size effect". He concludes that the CAPM is misspecified.1 This then 
rose a lot of attention to the size-related anomalies after 1981. 
Keim (1983) found another anomaly related to firm size in 1983. His paper 
examines the empirical relation between abnormal returns and market value of NYSE 
and AMEX common stocks. Evidence reflects that daily abnormal return distributions 
in January have large means relative to the remaining eleven months, and that the 
relation between abnormal returns and size is always negative and more pronounced in 
January than in any other months. In addition, more than fifty percent of the January 
premium are attributable to large abnormal returns during the first week of trading in 
the year, particularly on the first trading day.2 
1 Rolf W. Banz 'The Relationship between Return and Market Value of Common Stock," 
Journal of Financial Economics 9 (1981), pp. 3-18. 
2 Donal B. Keim, "Size-related Anomalies and Stock Return Seasonality: Further Empirical 
Evidence," Journal of Financial Economics 12 (1983)，pp. 13-32. 
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The paper also suggests several hypotheses to explain the January seasonal 
effect in stock returns. They are the tax loss selling hypothesis and the information 
hypothesis. Since size is measured as total market value of equity, the smallest firm 
portfolios are biased towards inclusion of shares that have e^q>erienced large prices 
declines and therefore are likely candidates for tax loss selling. The theoretical value 
of the tax loss selling hypothesis dirninishes, with the existence of arbitrage possibilities 
in non-segmented markets with non-taxable investors. In addition, the hypothesis is 
not clearly supported enqjirically. 
The information hypothesis states that January is the start of the tax year for 
investors, the beginning of the tax and accounting years for most firms, and preliminary 
announcements of accounting earnings and make of the previous accounting period. 
Therefore, the month of January marks a period of increasing uncertainty and 
anticipation due to the impending release of important information. In addition, the 
gradual dissemination of the information during January may have a greater intact on 
the prices of small firm relative to large firms for which the gathering and processing of 
information by investors becomes a less costly process. The recurrence of significant 
small firm premia at the same time each year due to inadequate adjustment of prices to 
information is inconsistent with a rational expectation equilibrium in the market. 
Keim also suggests that the January effect may be due to spurious causes such 
as outliners, concentration of listings and delistings at year-end, or data base errors. 
I 
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Levis (1985) tries to examine the small firm effect and stock seasonalities on 
the London Stock Exchange. There was an average 6.5% per annum premium for 
smaller UK firms over the period January 1958 to December 1982 which is consistent 
in essence with other major stock exchanges. However, the size premiiim is even 
higher on a risk-adjusted basis. Smaller UK firms appear to be less risky than their 
larger counterparts. Furthermore, the UK evidence suggests the presence of more than 
one seasonal in the data which is inconsistent with the tax-loss selling hypothesis. It is 
more likely that these seasonals are related to the information effects resulting from the 
publication of annual and interim company accounts.3 
Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) examine the turn-ofthe-year effect, the firm size 
effect and the relation between these two effects for a sanq)le of over-the-counter 
stocks traded via the NASDAQ reporting system over the period 1973画 1985. Their 
results confirm earlier studies based solely on listed stocks. Small firms tend to earn 
significant positive abnormal returns in January and the converse holds true for large 
firms. Quoted bid-spread is highly correlated with firm size cross-sectionally. Both 
variables appear to be significant in explaining average excess returns in January. 
Average relative bid-ask spreads are stationary over the period immediately 
surrounding the turn of the year and across calendar months.4 
3 Mario Levis, "Are Small Firms Big Performers," The Investment Analyst, 76 (April 1985), 
pp. 21-27. 
4 Christoper G. Lamoureux, and Gary C. Sanger, ‘Tirm Size and Turn-of-the-Year Effects 
in the OTC/NASDAQ Market," The Journal ofFinance, Vol. XLIV, No 5 (December 1989)，pp. 
1219-1245. 
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In the eastern part of the world, the size and seasonality effect are also found. 
The study by Kato and Schallheim (1985) investigates the January and size anomalies 
in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The two anomalies are also found in the Japanese 
market. These similarities between US and Japanese markets may due to the well-
integrated markets on an international scale. This paper also doubts about the tax-
loss-selling hypothesis as explanation of the January-size effect. Further evidence is 
presented that indicates a possible June seasonal in the Japanese stock market.5 
Scholars do not only concentrate in the developed and large market, they are 
also interested in some developing market. Data from the Australia capital market 
are used to test for the size effect in the study of Beedles (1992). Beedles says that 
truly "small" firms are listed in Australia. After investigating a group of firms much 
smaller than those even in the OTC in the US, the size effect is found in these small 
companies. The illiquidity of the shares is then estimated and is found to be highly 
correlated with equity costs. The relation of size and illiquidity is negative and 
monotonic while the relation of illiquidity and risk-adjusted performance is positive and 
virtually monotonic. 
The paper by Herrera and Lockwood (1994) tests for a size effect in the 
Mexican stock market. The results show that the average stock returns are negatively 
related to firm size. They also find a positive risk premium for beta and a significantly 
5 Kiyoshi Kato and James S. Schallheim, "Seasonal and Size Anomalies in the Japanese 
Stock Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 20，No. 2，(June 1985), pp. 246-
260. 
6 William L. Beedles, "Small Firm Equity Cost: Evidence from Australia," Journal of Small 
Business Management, (July 1992) pp. 57-65. 
7 
negative risk premium for size. Beta is priced even after carefully controlling for size 
effects.7 
Some studies are done to try to explain why these anomalies happen. Many of 
them suggest that they are mainly due to the method of estimating betas. Roll (1981) 
tries to explain the small firm effect. He realized that the riskiness of the small firms 
had been improperly measured. The error is due to auto-correlation in portfolio 
retimis caused by infrequent tradings. Since small firms are traded less frequently, risk 
measures obtained from short interval returns data (such as daily) seriously understate 
the actual risk from holding a small firm portfolio, whatever the mode investors use to 
assess risk.8 
Equally-Weighted Index and Standard & Poor's Index are investigated for 
different holding period (daily, weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, quarterly and semi-annual). 
It is found that the average returns are over 12% per annum higher for the equally-
weighted index, which is more heavily invested in small firms than the S&P 500. 
However, the results on the data also show that the beta and the ratio of total 
variances increase uniformly and materially. Small-firm portfolios have higher auto-
correlation of returns because their constituent securities are less-JBrequently traded. It 
results that the daily variance of returns is more downward biased for the smaller firm 
Moreover, with auto-correlation present, the sair^le observations are not 
independently distributed, 
7 Martin J. Herrera and Larry J. Lockwood, "The Size Effect in the Mexican Stock Market," 
Journal of Banking and Finance 18 (1994)，pp. 621-632. 
8 Richard Roll, "A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect," The Journal of Finance 
Vol. XXXVI No. 4 (September 1981)，pp. 879-887. 
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Roll (1983) also investigates which mean return con^utational method can be a 
favorable choice in some empirical research. The reason seems to be that individual 
asset returns are not as well-behaved as people like. Bidividual assets do not trade 
continuously and there are significant trading costs. When the object of investigation 
is related to trading volume, trading frequency and trading costs, there can be 
measurement problems. The buy-and-hold mean gives an unbiased estimate of the 
holding period return on a realistic portfolio. The rebalanced mean gives an unbiased 
estimate of return for its strategy but it is not realistic if the period is short since 
rebalancing is so costly. The arithmetic mean gives a biased estimate of both the 
rebalanced and the buy-and-hold investment returns. If the basic data are very short-
term (e.g. daily) and arithmetic or rebalanced means were used, the estimated premium 
overstates the reward investors can expect from a buy-and-hold position in small firms 
Research with monthly returns are apparently much less subject to mean return 
estimation problems.9 
Handa, Kothari and Wasley (1989) show that the size effect is sensitive to the 
length of the return interval used in estimating betas. Beta changes with the return 
interval because an asset's covariance with the market and the market's variance do 
not change proportionately as the return interval is changed. Evidence from cross-
sectional regressions of returns on monthly and annual betas is inconsistent with beta 
changes stemming only from the higher standard errors of the longer-interval betas. 
9 Richard Roll, "On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm Premium," Journal of 
Financial Economics 12 (1983), pp. 371-386. 
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The size effect becomes statistically insignificant when risk is measured by betas 
estimated using annual returns.10 
The study of Bhardwaj, Brooks and Francis (1995) presents the magnitude of 
the size effect documented in prior studies using direct OLS regression are probably 
overstated. They show that betas when estimated with direct regression are 
considerably lower than those estimated with reverse regression. As a result, estimates 
of abnormal returns using direct regression beta essentially represent the upper 
boundary of the abnormal return. Furthermore, this phenomena holds irrespective of 
the market portfolio used for risk adjustment. Finally, the size effect is found only in 
January, and is more pronounced using the value-weighted market portfolio. In all 
cases, the size effect diminished with reverse regression betas. However, material and 
significant January size effects are still generally found with the lower boundary 
estimate of abnormal returns generated with reverse regressions.11 
The paper of Jegadeesh (1992) shows that when the portfolios are constructed 
in which so that the correlations between firm size and beta are small, the betas e>qplain 
virtually none of the cross-sectional differences in portfolio returns.12 
10Puneet Handa, S. P. Kothari and Charles Wasley, 'The Relation between the Return 
Interval and Betas: Implications for the Size Effect，” Journal of Financial Economics 23 (1989)，pp. 
79-100. 
11 Ravinder K Bhardwaj, LeRoy D. Brooks and Bill B. Francis, 'cMisestimation of Systematic 
Risk and Magnitude of the Size Effect: Evidence Using Direct and Reverse Regressions," Quarterly 
Journal of Business of Economics, Vol. 34 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-79. 
12 Narasimhan Jegadeesh, "Does Market Risk Really Explain the Size Effect? ” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27，No. 3，(September 92)，pp. 337-351. 
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Some papers relate the anomalies with other factors. Some interesting results 
are found. The study of Reinganum (1981) suggests that the simple one-period capital 
asset pricing (CAPM) is misspecified or that capital markets are inefficient. Portfolios, 
based on firm size, of earnings-price ratios experience average returns systematically 
different from those predicted by the CAPM. Moreover, the abnormal returns persist 
for at least two years. This means that these results are not generated by a market 
inefficiency, instead are by the misspecified model. The research also shows that after 
controlling returns for any E/P effect, a strong firm size effect still emerges. But after 
controlling returns of any market value effect, a separate E/P effect is not found. The 
value and E/P anomalies seem to be related to the same set of missing factors, which 
may be the firm size. 
Later, Wong and Lye (1990), using the data of the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore during 1975-1985, find that stock returns are significantly related to both 
size and E/P. However, unlike the US market, the Singapore market shows that the 
size effects is of secondary importance when compared with E/P effect. The higher 
E/P stocks have earned, on average, much higher risk-adjusted returns than the low 
E/P stocks. The E/P effect is clearly significant even after the size effect The E/P 
effect is more significant than size effect but not independent of firm size.14 
Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) use a multi-factor pricing model to investigate 
the firm size effect. The factors include the equally weighted NYSE index, value-
13 Marc R. Reinganum, <cMisspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies 
Based on Earring's Yields and Market Values," Journal of Financial Economics 9 (1981)，pp. 19-46. 
14 Kie Ann Wong and Meng Siong Lye, ‘Market Values, Earnings' Yields and Stock Return: 
Evidence from Singapore," Journal of Banking and Finance 14 (1990) pp. 311-326. 
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weighted NYSE index, the change in the state of the economy, the unanticipated 
inflation rate, the change in e jec ted inflation, the difference between the return of a 
portfolio of long-term government bonds, and the T-Bill rate and the changing risk 
premium. They first regress each of the 20 portfolios on the macrovariables in the first 
five years to estimate the variables' betas. Then they perform cross-sectional 
regressions with the twenty portfolio's returns on the obtained portfolio's multiple 
betas month-by-month in the sixth year for the twenty intervals. The cross-sectional 
regressions are confuted using a generalized least squares procedure taking into 
account the hetero scedasticity of the residuals. The results are estimated time series of 
risk premia associated with each of the macro-variables, from which they test the null 
hypothesis that the risk premia are zero.15 
Stoll and Whaley (1983) show that transaction costs at least partially account 
for the abnormality that the total market value of common stock equity varies inversely 
with risk-adjusted returns. Ignoring transaction costs, it appears that an investor can 
earn abnormal returns by concentrating his investments in low market value or low 
price per share stocks. However, to enact either of these trading strategies an investor 
is likely to face significant out-of-pocket transaction costs, including both the dealer's 
bid-ask spread and the broker's commission. The cost to the dealer of providing this 
liquidity arises from the risk of holding an inventory, from clerical costs, and from the 
losses he incurs in trading with more informed traders. Empirical studies of the 
proportional bid-ask spread have showa than it varies inversely with price per share 
15 K. C. Chan, Nai-fu Chen and David A. Hsieh, "An Exploratory Investigation of the Firm 
Size Effect," Journal of Financial Economics 14 (1985) pp. 451-471. 
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and a measure of trading activity, such as volume, and varies directly with a measure of 
risk such as return variance. In general, both the relative spread and the commission 
i /r 
rate decrease as the market value of the stocks in each portfolio increases. 
James and Edmister (1983) examine the relation between common stock 
returns, trading activity and market value. Their results show that there was an 
obvious positive association between mean daily trading volume and firm size as well 
as between the number of firms in the portfolio trading daily and firm size. The 
average daily trading volume and number of trading days of firms in each portfolio 
indicate that smaller firms trade substantially less frequently than do larger firms. 
However, the bias in beta estimates induced by infrequent trading does not appear 
large enough to explain the difference between the mean daily return of large and small 
firms. There is no significant difference between the mean returns of the highest and 
lowest trading activity portfolio, nor is there any evidence of an inverse relationship 
between trading activity and mean daily returns. The lack of significant differences in 
the returns of trading volume of trading day portfolios suggests that a liquidity 
premium does not exist for inactively traded common stocks. Moreover, the existence 
of a firm size effect and the absence of a trading activity effect suggests that the firm 
size effect is not attributable to trading activity.17 
Lloyd, Jaliera and Goldstein (1986) try to test the relationship among 
ownership structure, size and returns. The hypothesis is that firms with diffuse 
16 Hans R. Stoll and Robert E. Whaley, 'Transaction Costs and the Small Firm Effect," 
Journal of Financial Economics 12 (1983), pp. 57-79. 
17 Christoper James and Robert O. Edmister, "The Relation between Common Stock Returns 
Trading Activity and Market Value," Journal of Finance, Vol. 38 (1983), pp. 1075-1086. 
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ownership (manager controlled) have higher returns to condensate for the inherent in 
the agency relationship. They think that risk premium should be related to the firm size 
as the agency costs can be especially onerous in a small firm. However, the results 
show that there is no significant relationship between ownership and return.18 
The research of Jahera and Lloyd (1989) examines enqjirically the neglected 
firm effect using a different measure of information. The hypothesis is that excess 
returns are inversely related to the degree of information available as proxied by 
exchange listing even after controlling size and beta. Beta is estimated from the 
security returns for the previous four years. Then, they form portfolios based on size 
and level of information as proxied by exchange listing. Firms are grouped by size into 
five groupings. Then，based on exchange listing, firms were placed in one of three 
groups. A match-merge of the firms yields fifteen portfolios. Monthly excess returns 
for each portfolio for the years 1978 to 1981 are determined. A two-factor analysis of 
variance was applied to the monthly returns for the fifteen portfolios.19 
ANOVA is used to test the size effect, information effect and the interaction. 
The F-values suggest that size is not significant and the level of information as proxied 
by exchange listing is significant in explaining excess returns. The results indicate that 
NYSE firms have higher excess returns compared to OTC firms. They also show an 
insignificant size effect when exchange listing is held constant. 
18 William P. Lloyd, John S. Jahera and Steven X Goldstein, 'The Relation between Returns, 
Ownership Structure, and Market Value," The Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 9’ No. 2，(1986), 
pp. 171-177. 
19 John S. Jahera and William P. Lloyd, <£Exchange Listing and Size: Effects on Excess 
Returns," Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 16(5) (Winter 1989), pp. 675-680. 
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Reinganum (1992) shows that relative performance of small-cap stocks versus 
large-cap stocks can be predicted at longer-run investment horizon, such as five years. 
The size effect exhibits a tendency to reverse itself. Periods when the size effect is 
negative tend to be followed by periods when the size effect is positive. The smaller 
firms always outperform the larger ones. Subsequently, larger firms will reverse the 
situation in the next five-year period. The empirical evidence reveals that the size 
effect exhibits a strong tendency to reverse itself in five-year intervals. 
On the other hand, Berk (1995) argues that the size-related regularities in asset 
prices should not be regarded as anomalies. He shows that even in an economy in 
which firm size and risk are unrelated, the logarithm of a firm's market value always 
measures the firm's discount rate. The empirical result in that average return and the 
logarithm of market value are negatively correlated is therefore no more anomalous 
than the observation that risk and return are related. Even when firm size is assumed 
to be unrelated to riskiness, market value will be theoretically inversely correlated with 
realized return. Moreover, the asset pricing model might well price risk correctly, but 
the empirical specification may be incorrect of inappropriate. The CAPM might in 
reality hold perfectly, but the test may be conducted using a proxy portfolio that is not 
mean-variance efficient. Even if the proxy portfolio is mean-variance efficient，the beta 
of each stock may be estimated with error. Any error in the beta estimate must induce 
an error in the expected return predicted by the model, and so market value will 
20 Marc R. Reinganum, "A Revival of the Small-Firm Effect," The Journal of Portfolio 
Management, (Spring 1992)，pp. 55-62. 
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provide additional explanatory power. Thus, the observation that market value 
e邓lains the part of return not explained by the CAPM, by itself is not necessarily 
evidence that the CAPM is misspecified.21 
21 Jonathan B. Berk, "A Critique of Size-Related Anomalies," The Review of Financial 
Studies, Vol. 8，No. 2, (Summer 1995)，pp. 275-286. 
16 
CHAPTER m 
SHENZHEN STOCK MARKET 
Historical Background 
The year 1978 marked a new decade of development in China. The Chinese 
government set in motion a process of economic reforms aimed at decentralizing 
production and investment decisions and subjecting these increasingly to market 
influences.22 The "open door" policy resulted in a rapid economic growth in the 
following years. 
The Chinese government used different types of measures to mobilize domestic 
financial resources and improve the allocation efficiency offimds. The development of 
capital markets was set to be one of the aims of the financial reforms.23 
In 1981，securities issuing was permitted. It raised the discussion of 
establishing a stock exchange for the trading of securities, The aim was to provide a 
source of discipline. Shareholders was interested in monitoring the management of the 
firm in order to ensure that it undertook the most profitable investment so that the 
22 Hu Yebi, China's Capital Market (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993)，p.5. 
23 Ibid. 
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value of shares can be maximized. Moreover, if shareholders were dissatisfied with the 
performance of the firm, they could sell the shares，which in turn made the market 
price fall. Then rival managers might atten^t a takeover. Thus, managers would have 
an incentive to avoid this by managing the firm as efficiently as possible. Many people 
doubted about the feasibility as most companies in China were state-owned enterprises. 
Introducing a stock market meant that the companies might become privatized and 
China would then profess to take the socialist road. Nevertheless, this objecting voice 
did not stop the preparation of establishing a stock exchange. In 1986, the first stock 
market was set up in Shenyang. 
Some experimental stock markets were then started in other cities, like 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. At that time, the markets were extremely small. All tradings 
were over-the-counter and vigorous restrictions were set by the China government. 
Lots of confusions and problems were created. Each brokerage corr^any had its own 
trading mechanism, which led to highly divergent prices in different parts of the 
country. Speculation in over-the-counter markets and black markets became endemic. 
In order to standardize the operation of the securities markets, some 
"westernized" stock exchanges were required. Shanghai and Shenzhen had corseted 
for a long time to set up the first t6westernized" stock exchange in China. Shanghai 
finally became the first stock market on 19 December 1990. 
18 
Shenzhen, although lost the battle in becoming the first stock exchanges, it did 
not give up in setting up a stock exchange. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange was 
eventually opened on 3 July 1991 officially. 
Automatching system of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was iiiq)lemented in 
February, 1992. The original microcomputer network was replaced by Tandem in 
July, 1993, which enabled a daily matching capacity of 7 million deals. 
Intracity computer link with the brokers was realized in May, 1992. 
Telephone order system was put into operation in October, 1992. Nationwide real-
time quotation dissemination was made possible via satellite in April, 1993. From 
1994 to 1995, the Exchange set up 4 services bubs in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai 
and Chengdu and realized computers link with 23 securities trading centers 
nationwide. 
Membership of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange runs a membership system. Membership is limited 
to domestic financial institutions which have been authorized by the People's Bank of 
China to operate securities brokerage exchange. There is no individual members on 
the Exchange, and each member is allowed to hold a seat only as a limited corrqjany.24 




No. of Members in Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 






Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
Types of Shares 
Chinese equity markets are highly segmented. Three types of shares are 
currently issued by the Chinese enterprises: A shares, B shares and H shares. 
A Shares 
A shares are domestic ordinary shares denominated and traded in renminbi by 
PRC domestic legal entities, enterprises and individuals. Foreign investors are not 
permitted to acquire，trade or issue A Shares. A shares include State share, Legal 
Person Shares, and Natural Person Shares.25 Issuers of A shares do not need to 
prepare financial statements according to international accounting standards. A shares 
are now the largest segment of the equity market. 
25 China Securities Handbook 1995-1996, p.39 
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States Shares are shares that are held by the state. The state is required to be 
the majority shareholders. Types of industries having this type of shares are those in 
cckey bearing on national economic planning and people's livelihoods". 
Legal Person Shares are held by PRC "legal persons" such as enterprises, 
conq>aiiies and other economic or social entities but not natural persons. This type of 
shares are usually placed privately or issued publicly to selected organizations and are 
not generally traded on the securities exchanges. 
Natural Person Shares, are shares purchased by and traded amongst PRC 
natural persons either through an authorized securities dealer or on an exchange, 
subjected to the general limitation that no individual may hold more than 0.5% of the 
outstanding common shares of a listed conq>any. 
B Shares 
According to the rules governing the issuing and trading of B shares published 
by the Chinese authorities, B shares are denominated in foreign currencies • US dollars 
in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen. They are ordinary shares subscribed 
in foreign exchange and listed on the PRC exchanges. They are registered and issued 
exclusively for overseas investors, including authorized foreign legal and natural 
entities and individuals; legal and natural entities and individuals of Hong Kong，Macau 
and Taiwan and other people approved by the authority in charge. 
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It was first issued in February 1992. Issuers have to prepare financial statement 
according to international accounting standard. 
H Shares 
H shares are foreign currency denominated shares issued to foreign investors 
and listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. It was first introduced in July 1993. 
The issuers should meet the requirements of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. They 
need to follow the requirements of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in disclosing 
information. These requirements are much stricter than those in the Chinese stock 
markets. 
Listed Securities in Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
The total number of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchanges increased 
from 6 in 1991 to 132 in 1995. Table 2 shows the number of listed cort^panies from 
1991 to 1995. 
Table 2 
No. of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange 






Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
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Not many con^anies are listed in the Shenzhen Stock market because people 
are cautious about the market development adopted by the authorities. 
On 31 December, 1994，the total market capitalization of Shenzhen Stock 
Market was RMB112,801,481,158. However, on 31 December, 1995，it dropped to 
RMB98,069,998,825.27 Table 3，Table 4 and Table 5 illustrate the total market 
capitalization, market capitalizations of A-shares and B-shares respectively. 
Table 3 
Total Market Capitalization of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Market Capitalization 





Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
26 Michael Spencer, "Security Markets in China," Finance & Development, Vol. 32, Iss，2, 
(June 1995), p. 28. 
27 Sources: Fact Sheet December 1995，Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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Table 4 
Market Capitalization of A Shares 
Market Capitalization 
(in million RMB) 
30/12/94 103250 
29/12/95 87687 
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Table 5 
Market Capitalization of B Shares 
Market Capitalization 




29/12/95 7176 | 
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
The average P/E ratio was 10.37 in December，1994. It was 9.34 in December, 
1995. The P/E ratio of A shares in December, 1994 and December, 1995 were 10.67 
and 9.79 respectively, while those of B shares were 7.01 and 6.00 respectively.28 
28 Sources: Fact Sheet December 1995, Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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Dealing 
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has two trading sessions every day from 9.00 
a m to 11.00 a.m. and from 2.00 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. from Monday to Friday. On 
Saturdays, it only operates the morning sessions. It closes on Sundays and public 
holidays.29 
There is no daily limit on price fluctuations. 0.6% stan^ duty is required for 
each transaction but no capital gains tax is collected. The commission rates is 0.5%. 
Shenzhen A Index 
Shenzhen A Index is the barometer of Shenzhen A Shares. The index is 
confuted every thirty minutes. 
… . A T . current total market capitalization 
Shenzhen A Index = 
the market capitalization on the base date 
Shenzhen A Index showed an increase at the beginning of the Shenzben Stock 
Exchanges. Then, it declined in 1993 and moved steadily between 100 to 200 in the 
following years. When compared with the Shanghai A Index, which uses the same 
confutation as the Shenzhen A Index, Shenzhen A Index volatility is much lower. 
The Shanghai A Index fluctuated from 300 in Jan, 1992 to over 1400 in April 1993. 
29 Hu Yebi, China 's Capital Market (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), pp. 
54-55,61-62. 
30 Ibid., p. 62. 
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Then, it dropped dramatically afterwards to below 300 in June, 1993. After that, it 
rose again to about 600 to 700 level. (See Charts 1 and 2) 
The turnover rates of both indexes from 1992 to 1995 were quite similar, with 
a sudden peak at August and September of 1994. However, after this peak period, the 
turnover rates dropped dramatically. Then, they rose again but still could not regain 
the position. They just had some small crests after that period.(See Charts 3 and 4) 
The market value of the Shenzhen A Index increased largely during 1995. It 
indicated that there was a pool of new stocks listing during that period. Same 
phenomenon was found for the Shanghai A index, of which the increasing rate was 
even drastic. (See Chart 5 and 6) 
Characteristics of Shenzhen Stock Market 
Government Maintain High Control 
The Chinese authorities want to maintain control over the liberalization 
process. Government intervention resolves a marked information asymmetry between 
domestic firms and foreign investors. The tight control on the issuing and the pricing 
decisions help the authorities to ensure a certain minimum quality of issues to protect 
investors from fraud and market manipulation. This can reduce the possibility of 
scandals that might turn popular sentiment against the future development of the 
market. 
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Different Bodies Fight for Control 
The establishment of the modem market economy has gotten sidetracked by 
politics and bureaucratic turf battles.31 More than a dozen different government bodies 
are fighting for control to in supervising different aspects of the stock markets. The 
fledging China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is in charge of policing such 
practices as insider trading, misuse of stockholder fluids and false disclosure. 
However, as claimed by an official from CSRC, it is only a tiger without teeth. Local 
governments still have enough political clout to block actions against companies in 
their cities. 
Issuers Undergo Complicated Process 
The mechanisms of determining which firm is permitted to issue securities in 
China are unique. It is the Chinese authorities, not the market mechanisms, that decide 
which firms are allowed to issue shares. The determination is a strategy of ‘^ picking 
winners". The approach is dictated by the absence of adequate disclosure, absence of 
market regulation and absence of market-determined prices for corrqjeting assets. 
Market-based approach is not feasible in China as China does not have a market 
economy. 
Firms wishing to list A shares must obtain the valuation of their land and other 
assets by the State Assets Bureau and State land Administration. Then, they have to 
turn to the local government for approval to issue shares. When the application is 
31 Pete Engardio and Joyce Barnathan, "Take a Nap. Read a Book. It's the Shanghai Bourse," 
Business Week, (May 1, 1995), p.56. 
32 Ibid., p.56. 
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approved, they need to seek approval from the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). 
The central government sets a quota for A shares listing as a whole so as to 
control market development. Subject to the quota, approval is given to only one or 
two listings firom each province or municipality on each exchange. Consequently, in 
July 1994, the authorities postponed planned issue in order to support the market. 
The strategy may cause some problems. Non-economic factors may receive 
too much attention in the selection process. Because of the quota system, some more 
profitable firms in the industry may not be allowed to be listed because of its 
geographic position. 
There is no quota for B shares listings. Yet, the approval process is even more 
con^plicated and tightly controlled. The enterprises must first prove that they need 
foreign exchange despite the procedures as of issuing A shares. In 1993, A shares 
issued from provinces that had not taken up and distributed their allotment of 
government treasury bonds were prohibited to issue B shares.33 
The central authorities is responsible for the selection of H shares issuers. 
Large enterprises having significant capital needs and generating sufficient foreign 
exchange earnings that enable them to pay dividends in foreign currencies are chosen. 
33 Michael Spencer, "Security Markets in China," Finance & Development, Vol. 32, Iss, 2, 
June 1995,p.29. 
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Banks Frequently Change Its Role 
Until early 1993, banks were intimately involved in the securities markets，as 
most securities firms were bank subsidiaries or affiliates and the markets were 
regulated by the People's Bank of China. Nevertheless, the authorities were concerned 
with the mixing of banking and securities activities resulting in the diversion of credit 
away from the productive sectors of the economy. The banks liad little or no prior 
experience in securities markets and they were exposed to new risks. Therefore, they 
introduced regulations providing for a complete separation of the industries. Banks 
had to close or sell their securities subsidiaries and call in the loans they had issued to 
securities firms and investors, and they were forbidden to have any further involvement 
with securities markets. Margin lending is not allowed, and securities firms and 
exchanges were not permitted to seek insurance from banks in the form of lines of 
credit. This, then reduced the liquidity in the secondary market.34 
The lack of liquidity also increased the probability of a settlement failure and 
knock-on-failures in other institutions, as the resources available to any one member of 
a stock exchange would be lower in the absence of bank credit lines. As a result, the 
authorities had to weigh the likely incidence and costs of these different types of risk 
against the risk of securities market developments affecting the flow of credit or 
irnqp airing the health of the banking industry.35 
34 Michael Spencer, "Security Markets in China," Finance & Development, Vol. 32, Iss, 2， 
June 1995, pp. 30-31. 
35 Ibid., p. 31. 
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The low liquidity and declining prices in A share market in July caused the 
CSRC to propose that banks should be allowed to lend to securities firms and that joint 
Sino-foreigii investment companies should be established to manage mutual funds. In 
doing so, foreign funds could be invested in A shares. However, the proposals then 
ceased because other government agencies opposed to the proposal. 
Overheat Economy Impact much on Market 
Misuses of money are common in China. It reinforced the Chinese authorities 
fear in that private capital markets undermine its fight against inflation. Li order to 
cool down the economy, the government clanged down on credit from the state-
owned banks. It was reluctant to liberalize capital markets because it lost control over 
how conqjanies and financial institutions raised money. With weak supervision, 
conqpanies tend to pump the proceed of stock issues into property speculation and 
other dubious investments. Rather than improving the markets' behavior by regulating 
them, the Chinese authorities halted new stock flotations and corporate debt issues.36 
Currently, half of the 100,000 state enterprises are losing money, if the private 
money markets are closed. They then need to borrow money from banks and the bad 
debts would pile up. This triangular debt burden will become larger and larger. It may 
37 
also threaten the market reforms. 
36 Pete Engardio and Joyce Barnathan, "Take a Nap. Read a Book. It's the Shanghai Bourse," 
Business Week, (May 1，1995)，pp. 56-57. 
37 Ibid., p.57. 
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Legal and Accounting Systems are not Well-established 
There is no clear nationwide framework of laws and regulations governing 
stock markets in China, including company codes, merger and acquisition regulations 
and securities transaction rules. The listing requirements are vague and how a 
coir^)any values its assets for the purpose of securitization is obscure. The local 
regulations of different cities are rudimentary and sometimes confiising.38 
Vast variety of accounting system used in the computation of corporate profits 
poses problems. Enterprises often undervalue their original assets so as to issue shares 
to their en^loyees at a discount to asset value. The shareholders thus taking 
advantage of the original owner, who are mainly the state itself. 
It is very difficult to get information in China's stock market. The listed 
corrq)allies have no obligation to disclose any significant information to the public. 
They needed only to hold a shareholder meeting once a year to announce the profits 
and losses.40 
38 Hu Yebi, China's Capital Market (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), p. 
72. 
39 Ibid., p. 73. 
40 Ibid, p. 74. 
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Immature Investors Misconceive the Stock Market 
People in China do not really understand what the stock market is. Their 
concept on investing in stock market is obsolete. They only pay attention to the 
dividend income paid by the company rather than the performances and prospects of 
the corrq)allies. Therefore, in order to attract more investors, companies offer 
exorbitant dividend rates to shareholders which most of them can ill-afford. 




DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Data 
The Data 
The data for this research study are taken from Taiwan Economic Journal Data 
Bank _ China (TEJ), which is a database that offers Chinese stock market data through 
a set of software packages. The database contains information of all the firms listed on 
Shenzhen Stock Market. 
The A shares market would be investigated in this paper. Closing prices from 
Adjusted Daily Price Data from TEJ (adjusted on bonus and issue) is used as daily 
closing stock price. Market value of the stock is calculated based on the following 
calculation: 
Market Capitalization = Closing price of the stock x Number of shares outstanding 
Daily data of Shenzhen A Index, is chosen to represent the market index. The 
information is also drawn from TEJ. 
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Sample Period 
Shenzhen Stock Market is a newly developing market. It opened in July，1991. 
M order to ensure a sample of sufficient securities for statistics analysis, the selected 
san^)le period is from 1st Jan, 1994 to 31st December, 1995. Seventy-seven securities 
are listed in the Shenzhen A Shares Market throughout this sair^)le period. 
Portfolio Formation 
Seven portfolios are formed for the investigation of size effect and seasonality. 
The portfolios are equally weighted. Each portfolio consists of eleven stocks. The 77 
securities are ranked based on the market capitalization of each stock in each year. 
The security with the largest market capitalization is selected to be the first security, 
then followed by the stock with the second largest market capitalization. The seventy-
seventh security is the one with the smallest market capitalization. Then, the first 
eleven securities form the first portfolio, the next eleven securities form the second 
portfolio and so on. As a result, seven portfolios are formed and each con^any in the 
largest portfolio is larger than all subsequent companies in other portfolios in the 
second largest one and so on. Since the market capitalization of each firm changes 
from year to year, stocks included in the portfolios are rearranged according to the 
change of the market capitalization of various years. 
Since the portfolios are equally weighted, the market capitalization is calculated 





Daily rate of returns are used to see whether there is a size effect on the 
Shenzhen A Shares Market. The rate of return of a security is calculated using the 
following formula: 
竹 Pi t -Pit - i 
Rit= 
P i t i 
where Rit is the raw rate of return of the stock of firm i at day t 
Pit is the daily closing price of the stock of firm i at day t 
Pit-i is the daily closing price of the stock of firm i at day t-1 
The portfolios' daily raw rate of returns are calculated by averaging all the raw 
rate of returns of the stocks consisting in the portfolio. 
1 E pt = — 
丄丄i=l 
where Ept is the raw return ofthe portfolio p at day t 
Ript is the raw return ofthe stocks in portfolio p at day t 




The return of the security is adjusted to account for systematic risk with the 
usage of the Capital Pricing Model. The market return is also calculated using the 
following method : 
_ Vmt _ Vmt • 1 
Rmt = 
Vmt - 1 
where Rmt is the raw rate of return of the market at day t 
Vmt is the closing value of the Shenzhen A Index at day t 
Vmt-i is the closing value of the Shenzhen A Index at day t-1 
The market model estimates and Pi are obtained by regressing the security's 
raw rate of return in a year against the market return in the same year. The beta is 
estimated by using ordinary least square (OLS) method with the data of 1994 and 
1995. A better way of estimating oti and Pi is to use data from the previous period. 
However, due to the short history of Shenzhen A Shares Market, the information is 
unavailable. 
RjtT = CCiT + PilRmtT + SitT 
where Rjtx is the raw rate of return of the security at day t 
CCiT is the return on zero beta asset estimated for year T 
Pi is the systematic risk of the security estimated for year T 
RmtT is the market return at day t in year T 
sot is the residual 
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Excess return of the security is calculated by: 
ERitT = RitT 一 OCiT — PilRmtT 
where ERitT is the excess return of the security i at day t in year T 
Riti is the raw rate of return of the security i at day t in year T 
otiT is the return on zero beta asset in year T 
Piiis the systematic risk of security i in year T 
RmtT is the market return at day t in year T 
Excess return of the portfolio is calculated by averaging all the excess returns 
of the stocks containing in the portfolio. 
E R p t = 去 z 肌 
丄上i=l 
where ERpt is the excess return of the portfolio p at day t 
ERit is the excess return of the stock i in the portfolio p at day t 




To test for whether seasonality exists in Shenzhen Stock Market, the excess 
rate of return of each portfolio on each month is used. The rate of return of the 
portfolio is calculated based on the following formula: 
1 
ERpt = — ^ERi t 
丄丄i=i 
where ERit is the excess return of the portfolio p at month t 
ERit is the excess return of the stock i in the portfolio p at month t 







The result of raw rate of returns of the portfolio in 1994 is as follows: 
Table 6 
Mean Raw Return in 1994 
Portfolio Raw Return Standard Deviation 
1 - Largest -0.014 0.4822 
2 -0.0052 "a5262 
3 -0.0108 "a5037 
4 — -0.0047 "05044 
5 -0.0112 0 5538 
6 0.0021 0 5708 
7 - Smallest 0.0021 | 0.5755 
It is found that two smallest portfolios have the highest rate of return among all 
seven portfolios, which is quite consistent with earlier literature's observation.(Also 
see Chart 7) However, the F-value using ANOVA test is 0.04 and the p-value is 
1.000, which indicate that the mean raw returns of these seven portfolios are not 
significantly different from each other. 
39 
For the data of 1995, the following result is found: 
Table 7 
Mean Raw Return in 1995 
Portfolio Raw Return Standard Deviation 
1 - Largest -0.0047 0.2892 
2 -0.0060 0.3122 
3 -0.0086 0.3222 — 
4 -0.0020 0.3130 
5 -0.0018 0.3496 
6 -0.0101 0.3138 
7-Smallest -0.0058 0.3597 ~~ 
The portfolios with medium market sizes, portfolio 4 and 5 are found to have 
the highest rate of return. (Also see Chart 8) However, the ANOVA test shows that 
these raw returns are not significantly different from each other. The F-value is 0.02 
and the p-value is 1.000. 
When both 1994 and 1995 data are used for analysis, the following table is 
obtained. 
Table 8 
Mean Raw Return in 1994 and 1995 
Portfolio Raw Return Standard Deviation 
1 - Largest -0.0094 0.3984 
2 -0.0056 — 0.4335 
3 -0.0097 — 0.4235 
4 -0.0034 — 0.4205 
5 -0.0066 0.4639 
6 -0.0039 0.4721 
7 - Smallest -0.0018 0.4807 
It shows an increase in rate of return as the firm size becoming smaller, while 
the smallest portfolio having the highest rate of return.(Also see Chart 9) 
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Nevertheless, again, the F-value? which is 0.02, and p-value, which is 1.0, show that 
the mean raw returns are not significantly different from each other. 
Excess Return 
When using excess returns, the results are different from those using raw data. 
The 1994 data show the following results: 
Table 9 
Mean Excess Return in 1994 
Portfolio Excess Return Standard Deviation 
1 - Largest -0.0001 0.0698 
2 0.0002 0.0902 
3 — -0.0001 — 0.0684 
4 — 0.1300 — 0.1017 
5 — 0.0485 0.2532 
6 — -0.0017 — 0.1540 
7-Smallest 0.0007 0.1282 
It is found that the portfolio with the medium size firms (Portfolio 4) have the 
highest rate of return when using excess return to analyze. (Also see Chart 10) F-value 
is 32.51 and p-value is 0.000 after running ANOVA test. Therefore, the result is 
significant. 
However, the 1995 data show an entirely different result: 
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Table 10 
Mean Excess Return in 1995 
Portfolio Excess Return Standard Deviation 
1 - Largest -0.0000 0.0693 
2 0.0103 0.2673 “ 
3 0.0002 0.0507 
4 -0.0008 — 0.0647 
5 ~ ~ 0.0002 — 0.0713 
6 0.0001 0.0579 
7 - Smallest 0.0004 0.1015 
Portfolio 2 has the highest excess return this time and portfolio 4 has the lowest 
excess return. While other portfolios have positive excess return, portfolio 4 has 
negative excess return, which is a loss relative to the market if investing in this 
portfolio.(Also see Chart 11) However, the results are not significant as the F-value is 
0.25 and the p-value is 0.958. 
On the other hand, using both 1994 and 1995 data together, the result is quite 
similar with that of 1994. 
Table 11 
Mean Excess Return in 1994 and 1995 
Portfolio Excess Return Standard Deviation 
1 - Largest -0.0000 0.0695 
2 0.0050 0.1994 — 
3 -0.0000 0.0603 
4 0.0658 — 01077 
5 0.0245 ~ 0.1883 
6 -0.0008 — 0.1167 
7 - Smallest 0.0004 0.1157 
Portfolio 4, which contains stocks with medium market size, shows the highest 
excess return.(Also see Chart 12) The F-value is 17.32 and p-value is 0.000. The 




Mean Monthly Excess Returns for 7 Portfolios (Also see Chart 13-19) 
month portfolio 1 portfolio 2 portfolio 3 portfolio 4 portfolio 5 portfolio 6 portfolio 7 
1 -0.00832 0.1785 -0.01203 -0,0456 -0.00545 0.00842 0.1600 
— 2 "^0.01466 ~ g i 5 4 5 0.00166 -0.0840 0.00326 -0.00401 0.01083 
— 3 "^0.00754 ~~gi074 0.01297 -0,0674 -0.00099 0,01888 0,0823 
— 4 "~gbl680 -0.0239 -0.00204 -Q.0194~ 0.0006]~ 0.00444 0.0844 
— 5 ~a01784 ~^0.0449 0.00687 -0.0925 -0.01096 -0.02847 0.01873 
— 6 ~0j06617 -0.1138 0.00654 -0.0020~ 0.00403~ -0.00256 0.0900 
~ ~ 7 ~0bl393 -0.2108 -0.00304 -0.0328~ -0.00432 -0.0138~ 0.0809 
— 8 "^0.00501 ~~a0303 0.00347 0.0790 -0.01414 -0.01312 0.1683 
— 9 "^0.01751 ~ a i 9 7 8 -0.00929 0,0837 0.01459 0.02563 0.1416 
10 1 .01068 ""“0.0581 ~^a00637 ~~a0729 0.00789 0.01489 0.1100 
— 1 1 "^0.00314 ""”0.0206 ~^g00400 ~~a0726 0.00856 -0.00733 0.0699 
12 ~0.00625 "^0.0049 ~ 0 0 3 6 8 ~~g0526 -0.00138 0.00154 0.0706 
1 -va lue —1.33 ~25.82 0.34 4.15 0.72 1.04 1.67 
~~p-value 0.207 0.000 0.977 0.000 0.724 0.407 0.07§~ 
Using the 1994 and 1995 data together, it is found that only portfolio 2 and 
portfolio 4 show some significant result. Both of them show that there is a decrease in 
excess return in the first half of the year. But from My, the return increases and 
reaches the peak in September. Afterwards, the return declines again. 




Mean Monthly Excess Return (Also see Chart 20) 
Month Excess Return 
一 1 一 0.0237 
2 — 0.0120 
3 — 00200 
• 4 “ 0.0028 
“ 5 — -0.0118 
• 6 -0.0042 
— 7 -0.0285 
“ 8 0.0258 
9 — 0.0563 
~ 10 ~ 0.0313 
“ 11 — 0.0229 
~ 12 ~ 0 .0122 
F-value 8.13 
p-value 0.000 
It shows that mean excess return are significantly different from each 
other, as the F-value is 8.13 and the p-value is 0.000. September has the highest 
excess return. It also indicates a decrease in the first half of the year and then an 




EXPLANATION OF THE SEASONAL EFFECT 
Li July, 1994, the Chinese government ordered the stock exchanges to suspend 
new listing of A shares. A flood of new issues and collapsing interest in emerging 
markets sent the Shenzhen A-share Index crash.42 This made the decline in the returns 
in July. 
Because of the low liquidity and declining prices in A shares market, the CSRC 
proposed in July，1994 to allow bank to lend to securities firms. It suggested that new 
credits could be extended to joint Sino-foreign investment brokerages to trade on A 
shares. The announcement of this proposals encouraged the market and the prices of A 
shares increased dramatically immediately since then.43 
At the same time, large amount of hot money arrived from Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. The number of investors playing in both Shenzhen and Shanghai markets 
junqjed from around 8 million in July to 19 million in August. The Taiwanese and 
Hong Kong investors used their mainland connections to invest into A shares. This 
42 Pete Engardio and Joyce Barnathan, ‘Take a Nap. Read a Book. It's the Shanghai Bourse," 
Business Week, (May 1, 1995), p. 56. 
43 Michael Spencer, "Security Markets in China," Finance & Development, Vol. 32, Iss, 2, 
(June 1995), p. 30. 
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brought about in $1 billion into the A shares markets. This, together with the rumour, 
resulted the increase of excess returns on the portfolios from July to September.4 
The rumour was then clarified when the proposals were opposed by many 
government agencies, including the People's Bank of China. The speculation by 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong speculators ceased and these people went out of the 
markets. The markets declined again after September 1994. 
All the above mentioned account for the evidence found from the research. 
Since only two years of data are used, the special events of one year significantly bias 
the results. 




Using the data from 1994 to 1995 of the Shenzhen A-share market, it is 
observed that there exists a size effect when using raw return., i.e. when the firm size 
becomes smaller, the return becomes larger. However, statistical tests indicate that the 
result is not significant. 
When excess return is used, an interesting result is given out, which is quite 
different from other markets. The medium-size firm portfolio, portfolio 4, is found to 
have the largest excess return and the result is tested to be significant. 
Nevertheless, there are some limitations on this research. The China market is 
still in its embryonical stage. It is very small when coBqjared with the markets in the 
previous researches. Investors are limited to PRC authorized entities and foreign 
investors are not permitted to enter the market. Information flows cause a difference 
as there are many restrictions in such a socialist community and there is no strict 
regulation on the disclosure requirements on the companies' information. Investors 
are immature and react quite different from Westerners. 
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Moreover, since the Shenzhen Stock Market is a very new one. Only two 
years of data can be analyzed. The result may be biased due to some specific events in 
this two years. The austerity measures and the hot money from other places made the 
market highly fluctuated. When the market becomes more well-organized, a further 
study is worth doing and a more reliable result may be resulted. 
In addition, the beta used in this research is only a simple estimation derived 
from the CAPM model. Many scholars has claimed that the beta needs to be stabilized 
in order to get a more accurate result. Therefore, after stabilizing the beta, a more 
significant result may be observed. 
When the market has longer history and more data are available, researches on 
the relationship of trading volume, P/E ratios with the size and capitalization can also 
be done. Then, we can understand more on the stock market based on the socialist 
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